Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1967

Afton S. Seegmiller v. Western Men, Inc., A
California Corporation, Western Girl, Inc., A
California Corporation, And Edward Hoopes, A
Resident Of The State Of Utah : Respondent's Brief

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Roy G. Haslam; Attorney Respondent
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Seegmiller v. Western Men, No. 10939 (1967).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4342

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
AFTON S. SEEGMILLER,
Plairintiff-A ppelloot,
-vs.WESTERN MEN, INC.,
A California Corporation,
WESTERN GIRL, INC.,
A California Corporation, and
EDWARD HOOPES,
A resident of the State of Utah,
Defendarnts-Respondents.

Case·
No.10939

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
Appeal From the Judgment of the
Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County,
HoNoRABLE STEWART

M.

HANSON,

E

Judge

BIELE, JONES & MURPHY
8
DROY G. HASLAM
...
117 East Fourth South Street
i
NOV 6 - 1967
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
~-·····..
Attorneys for Defe'Ybdants
~ Cit.~ S~p;;;··e;..,.. Ufala ..
a'Ybd Respondents
1

LORIN N. PACE
WATKINS, PACE & WATKINS
336 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellarnt

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

N /\ TURE OF THE CASE

--····--·-··············-------··-------------------------

1

DI .':!POSITION IN THE LOWER COURT____________ _______ __ ________ _____

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL... _______________________ ---------------------------

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS ______________ -----------------------------------------------------

2

ARGllMENT --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

8

POINT I. THE FINDINGS ARE ADEQUATELY SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE._____________________________________________

8

POINT IL THE WESTERN MEN CONTRACT MAY BE
TERMINATED WITHOUT CAUSE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT....

10

POINT JII. THE WESTERN GIRL CONTRACT IS TERM JN ABLE FOR SUFFICIENT CAUSE AND SUFFICIENT CAUSE FOR TERMINATION WAS SHOWN ....

14

POINT IV. SINCE DEFENDANTS DID NOT BREACH
THEIR CONTRACTS, APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO DAMAGES _______ --------------------------------------------------

16

CONCLlJSION ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

19

AUTHORITIES CITED
Cases
Busam Motor Sales v. Ford Motor Company,
203 F.2d 469, 1953.------------------------------------------- -------- -- ---------------------

13

Erskin v. Chevrolet Motor Company,
117 SE 706. 158 NC 479 _______________________ ---------------------------------------

15

In Re Hanwn's i:state, 87 Utah 58, 52 P.2d 1103... ----------------------------- 8, 9
Jensen's Used Cars v. Rice. 7 Utah 2d 570, 353 P.2d 259________________

18

;\Jai·tin v. Ford Motor Company, D.D. Mich. 93 F. Supp.
920, 1950 ----- ---- -- ---- -- ------ -- ---- ---- - ------ ------- ------ ----------------------------- -----------

13

Moon Motor Car of New York v. Moon Motor Car Co.,
29 F.2d 3 __________________________________________________________________________________________ 12, 13
Pbin City Irrigation Company v. Hooper,
11 Utah 2d 188, 356 P.2d 625 ... -------------------------------------------------------

18

T<:>rre Haute Brewing Company, 102 F.2d, 425 (CCA8)____________________

15

Watkins v. Rich, 254 Mich. 82, 235 NW 845 ..... -----------------------------------

12

TABLE OF CONTENTS- (Continued)
Page

TEXTS
3 Am Jur 2d, Agency, Sec. 47.................................................................. 11
32 A.L.R. 212.............................................................................................. 11

52 A.L.R. 947.... ------------·------·---·-···-·-············································-······
11

89 A.L.R. § 254 --·----·-------------·····--···-··-----······-··········-····················-·-··
11

2 C.J.S., Agency, § 74 -···------·------·-·················--····--···---·--··--·-·----·-·········
11

3 Am Jur 2d, Agency, § 48--·--·-··-·····---····--··--------···········---·--·················
14

32 A.L.R. 227.... ----·-----------·---------·····----···---·-·--·-···-·········-···············-·---·-···
14

52 A.L.R. 548 ............. ---·--------··----·····--··-·--········--·-······-·-········--··············
14

89 A.L.R. 257.... ------------------··--·····--·-·······-········--·--------··········-··-·············
14

17 C.J .S., Contracts, § 399........ ---·-·--·-·······--················---····--------------·-······
14
Restatement of Agency 2d edition § 409............................................ 14

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
AFTON S. SEEGMILLER,
Plaintiff-A ppellarnt,
-vs.WESTERN MEN, INC.,
A California Corporation,
WESTERN GIRL, INC.,
A California Corporation, and
EDWARD HOOPES,
A resident of the State of Utah,
Def enda~its-Respondents.

)
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Case
No.10939

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
The Plaintiff filed an action against the defendant
corporations claiming that the franchise agreements between said corporations and the Plaintiff had been improperly terminated asking the court to reinstate such
agrecmeuh; and award Plaintiff damages.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
After trial of the issues, the District Court, Judge
Stewart M. Hanson, entered its Findings of Fact and
1

Conclusions of Law and Judgment, and tlwrein determined that the contracts had been properly terminateLl,
and that such terminations were effedin• and final 011
.March 1, 1967.
During the trial, the parties made accountings in
relation to the operation of the franchise agreements,
and the Court entered a judgment for certain sums held
in reserve and required an accounting hy the Defendants.
The defendant corporations complied with the Order of
the Court, submitted an accounting, and paid the sums
due thereunder to the Clerk of the Court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks to reverse the decision of the District Court and ca use such Court to make certain unspecified Findings of Fact which would allow a resulting Conclusion of Law to the effect that the contracts \\·ere improperly terminated and that the Appellant is entitled to
general damages for breach of contract.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff-Appellant, Afton Seegmiller, herein referred to as ''Appellant,'' has incorrectly stated or misstated facts in several critical areas.
Some of the statements contained in Appellant's
Brief which are inconsistent with the facts or not supported by the records are as follows:
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A. Although the record is replete with instances
of defalcations by the Appellant and instances
whl'rc' the Defendants have complained to Appellant
i11 relation to her conduct, (Tr. 179, 180, 280, 315,
:317) the Appellant on page 3 of her Brief incorrectly
8latt's that the Appellant operated both franchises
without incident until December 26, 1966, the date
of termination.
B. Although there is no evidence as to future
or potential profit in the record, the Appellant stated on page 4 of the Brief that Appellant stood in
good position to earn good profits.

C. The Appellant, without supporting evidence,
011 pagr 5 of its Brief sets forth certain conclusions
as though they were facts. For example, the Appellant concludes that the Court's Order of January
17, 1967, (R. 56, 57) effectively destroyed Appellant's ability to operate under her contracts. The
OrclN referred to specifically allows Appellant to
operate under the contracts, and the statement of
the Appellant is a conclusion of Appellant and not
facts.
D. On page 3 of Appellant's Brief, the Appel"'1-ng:fl.T£ Ftkr7
lant again sets forth an
as though
~'iiPPoRJ;,EV e y
it were • tacts when it is stated that, " ... It was
because of the G.S.A. contract that the Plaintiff
obtained the Western ~fen franchise agreement .... "
E. Although the franchise contracts do not contain production schedull's or requirements, other
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than the general directive to develop the husine 8R
and business reputation, the Appellant on page 5 of
her Brief states she expanded the business to a
greater degree than required by the contracts. Since
there was no specific confracrt requirement this
creates a false impression.
In order to clearly present the facts in chronological
order, they are restated, eliminating conclusions of law
and matters not supported by the record.
The Respondents Western Girl, Inc., and \Vestern
J'vlen, Inc., are California corporations, qualified to do
business in the State of Utah, and engaged in the business of providing temporary employees to customers
with fluctuating employment requirements.
On March 20, 1964, Appellant entered into a contract with Defendant, Western Girl, Inc., to provide girls
for temporary employment in a territory described as
the Wasatch Front (R. 18, 24).
On the 31st day of March, 1965, Appellant entered
into a contract with Defendant, Western Men, Inc., to
provide men for temporary employment for various
clients in Salt Lake City, Utah (R. 25, 28).
On September 13, 1966, the Defendant, Western :Meu,
Inc., entered into a contract with the General Servicl!s
Administration, hereinafter referred to as "G.S.A." to
furnish the United States Government with temporary
male personnel required at Clearfield, Utah (R. 37, 3:5).
4

Paragraph I (i) of the agreement between Appellant
ancl Y.l es tern Men, Inc., provides as follows:
'' ... We will attempt to obtain government work
and work from companies having offices in more
than one city for your agency whenever possible . . . . " (R. 25).
Defendant, Western Men, Inc., requested Appellant
to se1Tice the G.S.A. contract and supply needed personnel (R. 15, 16).
v\lith relation to the Western Girl, Inc., franchise
contract, the Appellant defaulted in the performance of
the agency contract in the following particulars:
A. Appellant failed to develop the name and
business of Western Girl, Inc., as required by the
provisions of paragraph 2a. of the agreement (Tr.
262, 263).
B. The Appellant failed to equip and maintain
an office properly identified as a Western Girl office
in violation of paragraph 2b. of the agreement (Tr.
169, 270) (Exhibits D 36, 37, 38).
C. The Appellant failed to follow the recommendations requiring signs on the offices and doors
and windows as required under paragraph 2c. of the
frauehise agreement (R. 25, 28) (Tr. 166, 270).
D. The Appellant failed to provide advertis_ing
and promotional material as required by paragraph
2c. of the agreement (R. 25, 28) (Tr. 281, 282).
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With relation to the \Vestern Men, Inc., francliiR 0
contract, the Appellant defaulted in the performance of
the agency contract in the following particulars:
A. In violation of paragraph 2a. of the agreement, the Appellant failed to develop the name and
business of Western Men, Inc. (Tr. 262, 160, 263).
B. In violation of paragraph 2b. the Appellant
failed to maintain and properly identify the office,
and such office was maintained at an unsuitable location (Tr. 166).
C. In violation of paragraph 2d. of the agreement, the Appellant failed to transmit employee's
tiffie cards in accordance with schedules (Tr. 305)
(Tr. 162, 178).
D. Appellant failed to properly service the
G.S.A. contract and supply the needed personnel

(Tr. 315, 316).
On October 12, 1966, the Defendant, \Vestern 1\Icn,
Inc., received a notice from the G.S.A. indicating the
failure to properly service and perform the contract and
the Government's intention to terminate the same
(R. 30).

The Appellant was advised of default and franchise
problems in several telephone calls on and after October
12, 1966 (Tr. 146, 190).
The Appellant maintained offices at six locations
(Tr. 166), and the location of the office at the time of
6

till· t(•rmination of the contract was a residence at 4141
South 7th East, Salt Lake City, Utah (Tr. 169); sec i1hot 1 ( l1~xhihit D 35, D 36, D 37, D 38). There was no ideul ifica iio11 of the office as a ·western 1\Ien - ·western Girl
J•;rnployme11t Office, except a phone listing ( 'rr. 270).
Appellant for ::;ome extended period of time had not
been readily available during office hours, and it was extremely difficult for the San Francisco office of the Def euclants to contact Appellant (Tr. 184, 185).
Defendants furnished oral notice of termination of
the t\rn agency contracts on December 26, 1966 (Tr.
8, 11).

Defendants furnished Appellant ·with formal notice
of termination of the two ageucy contracts on December
:lO, 19GG (R. 32, Tr. 32, and Exhibit P 22).
Appellant filed a Complaint and obtained a Tempor:uy Order restraining the Defendant, Wes tern Men,
Ine., from interf eriug with the franchise agreement and
sc1Tici11g tlrn contract between ·western Men, Inc. and
the G.S.A. (R. 9).
After heariug on the Order to Show Cause, the Court
morlified the Restraining Order continuing the restraint
on clrfeudants as to interference with the Appellant's
opl'ra ti on of the ·western Men, Inc., franchise agreenwHt, hut allowing the Defendant, \Vestern Men, Inc.,
1o perform the duties required of it by its contract with
tl10 General Services Administration (R. 56, 57).
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After various hearings and pretrial proccclures, the
cause came on regularly for hearing and was tried, and
the Court entered its Memorandum Decision and it 8
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE ADEQUATELY SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
The Appellant makes no claim that evidence proffered by him was improperly excluded, but to the contrary, claims that the Court erred in judging the veracity
of the witnesses and in sorting the evidentiary wheat
from chaff.
This Court has many times affirmed the doctrine that
it will not substitute its interpretation of the evidence
for that of the trier of the facts.
It should be noted that both points relied on by
Appellant for reversal relate not to the application of
the law to the facts, but claim that the facts found by
the trier of facts are not to the liking of the Plaintiff.
This cause was tried by the Court and the Court was
extremely liberal in allowing the Plaintiff to introduce questionable evidence (Tr. 5, 17, 18, 44, 219).
An indicated by Justice Wolfe in the landmark decision of In Re Hanson's Estate, the Supreme Court will
not second-guess the Trial Court on evidentiary matters:
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'' ... We cannot disturb the findings if there is
any competent evidence to support them. Moreover, since the case was tried to the Court and
i10t to a jury, we must presume that the Court
ignored incompetent evidence in making a finding, if there is any substantial competent evidence
to support it. There cannot be any objection to
('Onclusions of fact in findings if there is any competent evidence to support the conclusions.... ''
In Re Hanson's Estate, 87 Utah 58, 52 P.2d, 1103.
The findings of the Lower Court are abundantly supported by the record.
Findings 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9 are routine uncontested
findings arising by way of admissions or exhibits receind in evidence without contest.
Finding No. 5 relates to Appellant's defaults in the
performance of the Western Girl, Inc., agency agreement
and is supported by the evidence (Tr. 169, 270).
Finding No. 8 in essence finds that there is no confusion of terms, inconsistency of terms or ambiguity in
the contracts and therefore the written documents contain the total obligations of the parties. This is a finding
of ultimate fact from all evidence adduced by the parties.
Finding No. 10 results logically in that the Western
~Ten contract was by its terms not exclusive and restricted to Salt Lake City, and provided for the franchisee to
f>e1Tice National accounts (R. 25).
Fi11ding No. 11 relates to Appellant's defaults in the
p<>rformance of the \Vestern l\f en, Inc., agency agree9

meut and is supported b~T the evidence (R. ;)O, Tr. HG
190, P22).

I

Finding No. 12 is a restatement by the Court of the
existence of certain court orders and their effect
Finding No. 13 results from the fact that no evidence of a conspiracy was adduced.
Since each :finding of the trial court is supported by
substantial competent evidence, the findings of the trial
court should be affirmed.
POINT II
THE WESTERN MEN CONTRACT MAY BE
TERMINATED WITHOUT CAUSE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THE
AGREEMENT.
The Western Men agency contract contains the following provision with respect to termination:
'' 5. In the event you wish to terminate this contract, you agree to give us at least sixty clays notice in writing. In the event we wish to terminate, we will likewise give you sixty days notice
in writing. During said period you shall co11fornc
to maintain complete operations unless arrangements are made between us for earlier termination.'' (R. 25, 28.)
Most jurisdictions have held that where an agency
contract contains a provision allowing termination without restriction, a party may cancel the contract without
being subjected to a claim for hrcach of contract. (Sec
10

:~Am .•Jur. 2d, Agency, Sec. 47, 32 A.L.R. 212, G2 A.L.R.

il47, 80 ,\.L.R. ~· 254.)

''A principal may rightfully revoke an agency
where such act is in accord with the parties agreement. He may, also, reserve the right to revoke
the agency contract when in his judgment the con<luct of the agent is unsatisfactory .... " (2 C.J.S.,
Agency§ 74.)
Iu the instant case the conduct of the Appellant in
com1ection with her servicing of the Government contract was such that she placed the Defendant, Western
:\le11, Inc., in a position of jeopardy with the General
SerYices Administration and the Defendant, \Vestern
Men, foe., had no alternatiYe but to exercise its right of
termi1wti<Jll as provided in the agreement.

Although the \Vestern :Men agency agreement was
]Jy its terms restricted in geographical area to Salt Lake
City, Utah, the Defendant nevertheless did not service
the Go\·ernmcnt contract ( G.S.A.) at Clearfield, Utah,
until after the entry of a judgment authorizing it to so
clo (Amended Order, R. 56, 57). The Defendant, vVest<.•rn :\Ien, Inc., operated pursuant to said Order and the
Appcllnnt clicl not appeal from or contest such Order.
In the instant case, the contract between Western
:JI en, Inc., and Appellant had an explicit provision authorizing termination witha sixty days written notice
without ca use. This provision for termination had equal
application if Appellant had desired to terminate.
Although no reason for termination is required, it
should he noted that the record is replete with cause for
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termination (Tr. 305, 306). It should also be noted that
\Vestern Men, Inc., was required to terminate the arrangement whereby Appellant serviced the G.S.A. contract or subject itself to substantial damages resulting
from the termination of its contract by the Government
(R. 15, 16).
The election to terminate the contract was made by
Respondent because Respondent's business was in jeopardy and there is no evidence that the election was madr
for any malicious or devious reason.
Appellant cites two cases to support its contention
that the \V" estern Men agency contract could uot be terminated except for cause. In the case of Watkins"· Rirl1,
254 Mich. 82, 235 NW 845, the facts were that the Def endant craftily manipulated Plaintiff i11to a contract for the
purpose of obtaining additional security and upon obtaining such security and within one month cancelled
the contract. This case is clearly distinguishable from
the present case for in the present case there is no evidence of fraud in the inducement to the contract or that
the cancellation arose by reason of fraudulent intent. The
plain fact is that the Appellant failed to develop business and that she operated both agency contracts at a
loss (Tr. 262, 263).
The case of Moon Motor Car of New York v. Moon
JI otor Car Co., 29 F.2d 3 is clearly distinguishable from
the present situation, for in that case the agency contract was terminable only upon violation of conditions
('Ontained in the agreement.
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A correct analysis of the principle set forth in the
1V at kins v. Rich case, Supra, is contained in the case of
Martin v. Ford Motor Company, D.D. Mich. 93 F. Supp.
920, 1950. This case involves a contract similar to the
Western Men contract providing for termination by
eitlier party with sixty days' notice. The Court distinguished the Watkins v. Rich case and held:
''The agreement in this case was not for a fixed
period of time, but was terminable at any time at
defendant's will upon compliance with the requirement as to notice. It is beyond the power of
the judiciary to engraft conditions upon the exercise of such contractual right.''
A later Michigan case, Busam Motor Sales v. Ford
Jlotor Cornpany, 203 :B-,.2tl 469, 1933, involving a dealership contract terminable at the will of either party with
written notice, also discussed Watkins v. Rich and analyzctl the problems contained therein at length. The
Court concluded the Watkins case stands for the prineiple that if a manufacturer lacked good faith at the
inception of the agency agreement then the termination provision would be no defense to the agent's action
to recover damages resulting from cancellations of the
agreement.
As indicated by the above causes and authorities,
the termination of a contract in accordance with its provisions is not subject to question as to motive) reason
or intent unless at the time of creation of the contract
there was bad faith or fraud in the inducement.
The District Court's Conclusion of Law No. 1 is
well founded in law and should be sustained.
13

POINT Ill
THE WESTERN GIRL CONTRACT IS TERJ\IINABLE FOR SUFFICIENT CAUSE AND
SUFFICIENT CAUSE FOR TERMINATION
vVAS SHOWN.
With respect to termination, the Western Girl contract provides as follows:
"6. In the event you ·wish to terminate this
agreement for a just arnl reasonable cause, you
agree to give us at least sixty days notice in
writi11g. In the event we wish to terminate for
just and reasonable cause, we 'Sill like·wise gin
you sixty days notice in ·writing. During said period you shall continue to maintain complete operations unless arrangements are made between
us for earlier termination." (R 23.)
It is clear that an agency contract may 11e caneeller1
for default or inability to perform on the part of the
agent or contracting party. (See 3 Am. J ur 2c1 agency,
§ 48, 32 A.L.R. 221, 52 A.L.R. 548, 89 A.L.R. 257, 17
C.J.S. Contracts, ~ 399).
The principk•s are also re-emphasized in the Restatement of Agency:
''A principal is privileged to discharge before
the time fixe<l by contract of employment an agent
who has committed such a violation of duty that
his conclnct constitntes a material breach of
contract.''
''An unexcused failure to substantially perform
the work which he has contractcrl to do, or serious
violation of duty of loyalty or o hec1ience, constitute a breach of the entire contract.'' (Restatement of Agency 2cl edition ~ 409.)
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Defendant's, Western Girl, Inc., right to cancel depends on proving only that there was fair and honest
rrason for termination (R. 23, Paragraph 6).
Appellant by her contract was required to develop
the uame and business of vVestern Girl, Inc. (R. 20 Paragraph 2a.) and to equip and maintain a properly identified and suitable office (R. 20, Paragraph 2b).
The Appellant failed to develop business and in fact
consistently operated the Western Girl franchise at a
loss (Tr. 262, 263). The Appellant operated from various unsuitable business locations (Exhibits 35, 36, 37,
38) (Tr. 169) and failed to advertise and properly identify her offices (Tr. 166).
The District Court after trial made proper findings
aml as iudicated in Point I of this brief these findings are
supported by the evidence and should be sustained.
The case of Erskin v. Chei·rolet Motor Company, 117
SE 706, 158 NC 479, cited by the Appellant is not applicahle to the case at hand for the Erskin case involved
an oral agency agreement and there were specific findings of fraud and reliance on fraudulent representations.
These elements are neither pleaded nor invoked in the
rnse at bar.
'l1he Appellant further relies on the Terre Haute
Brewing Company case, 102 F.2d, 425 (CCAS) which
l'ase is also not in point for in the Terre Haute case an
oral agency agreement was involved and the extent of
the term was at issue. In the present case a written
15

contract is involved and the Lo,ver Court found that
the defendant failed to perform her written agreements.
The record discloses no claim of fraud or fraudulent
representations.
As indicated under Point I the findings of the trial
court should be sustained.
The District Court's conclusion of Law No. 2 stating that the contract was terminable for cause and was
so terminated, is well founded in the facts and funuamental contract law and should be affirmed.
POINT IV
SINCE DEFENDANTS DID NOT BREACH
THEIR CONTRACTS, APPELLANT IS NOT
ENTITLED TO DAMAGES.
Appellant charges that Defendant, \V es tern :Men,
Inc., breached the Western Men contract by replacing
the Appellant as operator of the G.S.A. contract prior
to terminating the Wes tern .'.\Ien contract. It is to be noted that the franchise holder of the "Western Men contract is restricted to the Salt Lake City area. The contracting parties to the G.S.A. contract are the General
Services Administration on one hand, and Wes tern l\1en,
Inc., on the other hand.
As indicated by the findings of the District Court in
the hearing on issuance of the restraining order, the
\Vestern l\Ien contract was restricted to Salt Lake City,
Utah (R. 57, Paragraph 3), (Contract R. 27, Paragraph
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2g.). The G.S.A. contract was serviced by Appellant at
Clearfield, Utah, as a separate venture and required
tlifferent payment rates (R. 37, 53).
The Defendant, Western Men, Inc., was required by
the United States Government to correct servicing inadequacy under the G.S.A. contract and elected to replace Appellant as the servicing agent of such contract
and notified Appellant of this intention. The Appellant
in anticipation of the Defendant's termination notice
filed an action and asked for a restraining order (R. 1,
4). A temporary restraining order was issued (R. 9).
Appellant was not replaced as servicing agent until after
a hearing 011 the temporary restraining order and the
District Court by specific order allowed the Defendant,
\Vestern Men, Inc., to ser;ice its contract with the United States of America General Services Administration
(R. 1, Paragraph 2). A contrary ruling would have resulted in the Court ordering the Defendant to breach or
continue to violate its contract with the Government.
Defendant's, Western Men, Inc., conduct which was
strictly in accordance with the orders of the Court could
l1ardly be considered a breach of the contract. If Appellant had desired to contest this Court Order it could
have filed bond to stay the effect of the Order and appealed to this Court for a review of the District Court
Order.
Hfl V2- 8Efl\)

•

lt would .. ludicrous for the Court to require the
DPfendant Western Men Inc., to refrain from servicing
'
'
a eoutract between itself and the Government and cor-
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rectillg ddaults in said contract when such a ru]j 11 ,,
would have exposed "\Vestern 1\Te11, Inc., to the suhstm~
tial damages provided by such contract urnler conditions
where it Yrnnld haw· no recourse against the Appcllmn
for such damages.
The Appellant has not shown any breach of the writte>n contract by the Defendants and as stated bv
. thiR'
Court on many occasions, the intention of the partieR
and the meaning of the contract will he adduced from
the contract, and ·where the terms are plain, the l'Ontract
is conclusi\·e. Jensen's Used Cars v. Rice, 7 Utah 2d
;)70, 353 P.2d 259.
There is no claimed c011fusio11 of contract terms arnl
if the Court follows its rule of interpretation as set forth
in Plaiu City Irrigation v. IT oover:
"The beginning point of interpretation of n
contract has been saicl to be au rxamination of thr
language used." Plain City lrrigation Company\'.
Ilooper, 11 Utah 2d, 188, 356 P.2cl 62S.
then the District Court's conclusions nncl contract interpretations must be sustained.
-Western 1\fon, Inc., operated only in conformity with
its contract with the Unitecl States of Am0ricn and tlw
Orders of the Third .J uclicinl District Court, thereforr,
such action could not he considered as a breach of the
Defendant's contract with Appelhrnt and Appellant't>
/IV
f' t
contentions in this regard are not fournlecldaw or ac ·

18

CONCLUSION
The case at Bar is fundamentally simple. Two contrnds are before the Court. One contract could be terminated by either party by giving specified notice. The
Trial Court found that adequate notice was given. The
other contract could be terminated only for cause and
nftcr specified notice. The Trial Court determined that
there was cause and adequate notice was given.
Siuce the findings of the District Court are adequately supported by the testimony and record, the judgment
of the trier of the facts should be sustained.
No ambiguities can be found in the portions of the
contract invoked in the case and therefore there is no
justification for changing the terms and conditions thereof or modifying the decision of the District Court.
The decision of the District Court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
IRVING H. BIELE
ROY G. HASLAM
117 East Fourth South Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendants
and Responden.fs
Of Counsel
BIEL]~, JONES & MURPHY
J 17 ~~ast Fourth South Street
8alt Lake City, Utah 84111
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